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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE O·F UTAH
NATIONAL FAR'MERS UNION
PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE
GROUP and FARMERS
INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9625

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, an
insurance company, to recover from the defendant,
~another insurance company, attorney fee's and court
costs which the plaintiff incurre'd in defending an
action brought against John H. Morgan, Jr., the
named insured under a policy of liability insurance
issued to him by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who
admittedly insured John H. Morgan, Jr., seeks to
recover these attorney fees and costs from the defendant upon the theory that the defendant was
the primary liability insurance carrier, a fact which
is assumed in the Appellant's Brief (see page 1).
1
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The defendant denies that it afforded any insurance
coverage whatsoever under its policy to John H.
Morgan, Jr. which was in force and effect at the
time of and under the conditions of the accident
out of which the above mentioned action arose.
DISPOSTTION OF THE LOWER COUR'T
The case \Vas tried to the Court, who found in
favor of the defendant, concluding as set out on
page 41 of the Record:
"3. The attorney fees and costs incurred by the plain tiff were incurred by the
plaintiff and not by John H. Mor~an, Jr.
and were incurred by the plaintiff primarily
for the benefit of the plaintiff, and John H.
Morgan, Jr. is not obligated to reimburse the
plaintiff for any attorney fees or costs incurre'd.
"4. The defendant Farmers Insurance
Exchange has no obligation under its policy
to reimburse the plaintiff for attorney fees
or costs it incurred in the defense of the action against John H. Morgan, Jr."
The Farmers Insurance Group is not a legal
entity but is merely an association of insurance companies of which the F1armers Insurance Exchange
is one. Said Group issues no policies of insurance
and is not involved in this 'action. The case was dismissed as to said Group by the trial court, of which
the plaintiff does not complain. The words "defendant", "defendants", "respondent" 'and '"'respon2
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dents" are used in this brief to refer to the Farmers
Insurance Exchange.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The defendant and respondent seeks to sustain the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts is set out in the Appellant's Brief herein (pages 2, 3, 4 and '5) and
the following i's intended merely to supplement that
Statement.
Since the question 1as to whether the defendant
and respondent afforded John H. Morgan, Jr. any
coverage for the damages arising out of or the costs
of defending 'a lawsuit arising out of the accident
described in plaintiff's and Appel1ant's Brief depends upon an interpretation of the in'surance policy,
it is im portJant that we have the pertinent provisions
of the policy before us. The named insured under
the defendant's policy of insurance was Raymond
Earl Thom~as ( R. 26-31). The policy, Exhibit D-2,
provides:
" ( 2) the unqualified word 'insured' includes (a) the name insured . . . and (b)
with respect to the described automobile, ...
and any other person or organizations legally
responsible for its use, provided the actual
use of the automobile is by the named insured
or with his permission.
" ( 3)

the term 'the insured' is used sev3
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erally and not collectively, but the inclusion
herein of more than one insured shall not increase the limits of the Exchange's liability."
As to coverage, the Exchange agrees, within the
limits of the policy
"To pay all damages which the insured
becomes legally obliged to pay because of:
"(A) bodily injury to ·any person,
and/or
'' (B) damage to property, arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of an
automobile as hereinafter defined, and to defend at its expense any suit against the insured for such damages; but the Exchange
may make such settlement of any claim or suit
as it deems advisable."
In addition, under Supplementary Payments,
"The Exchange ·also agrees to pay, in
addition to the applicable limit of liiability:
"(b) all expenses incurred by the Exchange, all costs taxed against the insured in
any such suit, and all interest accruing after
entry of judgment until the Exchange has
paid, tendered, or deposited in court that part
of the judgment which does not exceed the
limit of the Exchang~'s liability thereon; ... "
Under Exclusions the policy provide's:

"'This policy does not apply under Part 1:
"6. while the described ·automobile is
being used in the automobile business, but
4
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this exclusion does not apply to the named insured or his relatives;

"
In the section of the policy designated Conditions, paragraph (17), the policy provi des
1

"'Under Coverages A, B, (set out above)
E and F, the Exchange shall not be liable for
a greater proportion of any los's than the :~p
licable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the total applicable limit of all
collectible insurance against such loss." (Paren thesis ours)
The policy of National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Company, which insured the automobile belonging to John H. Morgan, Jr., Exhibit
P-1, is sin1ilar to that of the defendant. Under its
terms the plaintiff agrees, under the section entitled
"SupplementJa;ry Payments"
"With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability, the
company shall:
" ( 2) pay all expenses incurred by the
company, all costs taxed against the insured
in :any such suit 'and all interest accruing after
entry of judgment until the company has paid
or tendered or deposited in court such part
of such judgment as does not exceed the limit
of the company's liability thereon;

"
Under the section applicable to other insurance, plaintiff's policy also provides
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"If the insured has o t h e r insurance
against a loss covered by this policy the company shall not be liable under this policy for
a greater proportion of such loss than the
applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the total applicable limit
of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such loss, provided, however,
under coverages A and B the insurance with
respect to temporary substitute automobiles
under Insuring Agreement IV or other automobiles under Insuring Agreement V shall
be excess insurance over any other valid and
collectible insurance.''
It should be further pointed out that the attorney fees and costs which we are talking ~about in
this case were not incurred by or are not owed by
John H. Morgan, Jr. but were rather incurred by
the plaintiff, National Farmers Union Property
& Casualty Company (R. 28), an'd that the p1aintiff does not assert any claim by or through John
H. Morgan, Jr. against the defendant but rather
a:sserts a claim in its own right against the defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE AUTOMOBlLE DRIVEN BY Ji0HN H. MORG.NN, JR. WAS 'BE'ING USED IN THE AUTOMOBILE
BUSINESS AND, THEREFORE, WAS NOT COVERED
BY THE DEFENDANT'S POLI'CY.
1

The defendant denied that it owed any coverage in this case by reason of the foregoing provi6
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sions in its policy, which provided that claims arising while the described automobile wa's being used
in the ~automobile business by someone other than
the named insured or his relatives are not covered.
The undisputed evidence shows that Raymond Earl
Thomas, the named insured under the defendant's
policy, was a salesman employed by the Bountiful
Moto1· Sales ( R. 27). Mr. Morgan had purchased
the vehicle, which he was having repaired, from the
Bountiful Motor Sales, then known as J. Golden
Barton Motor Company (R. 2'6). While his automobile was being repaired he asked Kay Browning,
service manager of the Bountiful Motor Sales, if
he might use another automobile (R. 27). Mr.
Browning had no such vehicle available and referred
Mr. Morgan to Dean Roberts, who had sold Mr.
Morgan's automobile to him (R. 27). Deian Roberts
did not have a car, but in turn referred Mr. Morgan
to Raymond Earl Thomas. Mr. Thomas let Mr. Morgan take his own automobile ( R. 27). Mr. Morgan
took the car to his own home ~and parked it in his
driveway and went in the house. While he was in
the house his little girl came out to the car in the
driveway and in some way jarred the brake or let
the brake off and the car rolled down the driveway
into the building owned by Daniel T. Wolfe, who
thereafter brought the aforementioned legal action
against John H. Morgan, Jr.
7
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It is the contention of the defendant, Farmers
Insurance Exchange, that the automobile belonging
to Raymond Earl Thom~as was being used in the
automobile business at the time of the accident in
the same manner that a demonstrator or other vehicle which may have belonged to the garage may be
used. Mr. Morgan was a customer of Bountiful
Motor Sales; he had brought his own car to that
company for repair; he had previously purchased
the same car from the Motor Company; and it does
not appear unreason1a:ble to infer that the Bountiful
Motor Sales was interested in keeping his good-will
in the hope that it might continue to receive his
patronage. 'There is nothing in the record to the effeet that Raymond Earl Thomas even knew John
H. Morgan, Jr. prior to his letting Mr. Morgan take
his 1automohile. It should, therefore, be obvious that
this iis not a case of one person doing a favor for
another or of a friend accommodating a friend. It
it is rather a man, who is interested in selling automobiles, letting a potential customer drive 1an automobile in the hope that he might thereby retain a
customer's good-will and continued patronage.
The provision of the policy eliminating automobiles used "in the automdbile business" is new
and there is a scarcity of cases construing this provision.
"The usuial omnibus clause in an auto8
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mobile liability policy excludes coverage of accidents arising out of use of an automobile by
persons operating an automobile repair shop,
public garage, sales agency, service station,
or public parking place. This annotation considers what constitutes use of a vehicle 'in
the automobile business,' another way of
phrasing such an exclusion in a liability
policy. . . .
"A diligent search has revealed only one
case interpreting the phrase 'in the automobile business,' as used in an exclusionary
clause in an automobile liability policy.
"In Cherat v. United States Fi(lelity &
Guaranty Co. (1959, CA 10 Okla.) 2 64 F. 2d
767, 17 ALR '2d 9'59, the court reversed a
judgment declaring that two insurance companies which had issue'd conventional liability
policies, one to the owner and the other to the
repairer of an automobile involved in an accident while driven by the repairman, were not
required to defend an action for damages
from the accident because of exclusionary
clauses in each of the policies, the owner's
policy excluding coverage of 'an owned automobile while used in the automobile business,'
and the repairman's excluding 'a non-owned
automobile while used ( 1) in the automobile
business by the insured,' and ~also provi'ding
that 'automobile business means the business
of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or
parking of automobiles.' ... " 71 A.L.R. (2d)
1

.964

In another case, McCree v. Jenning (Washington), 349 Pac. (2d) 1071, in which it was decided
9
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that the exclusion did not apply, the Court defined
the phrase to mean
"It would appear evident, therefore, that
an automobile 'used in the automobile business,' would be one which was employed for
some purpose in connection with that business.
For example, a tow truck, an automobile used
for demonstration purposes, or a vehicle used
for securing or delivering equipment and supplies would be 'used in the business.' But the
Jenning automobile was not turned over to
Miller to be used by him for his business purposes. It was simply brought to him to be
repaire'd. ''
The underlying principle exclu~ding !aUtomobiles
used in the automobile business, except in the case
of the named insured or h:ls relatives, from coverage under a liability policy is as stated in an annotation in 47 A.L.R. (2d) 556, wherein the omnibus
clause exception relating to public 'garages, sales
~agencies, service stations and the like is discussed:
''It has been said that the ·reason :for restriction of liability as to automobile repair
shops, garages, etc., in 'automobile liability
insurance policies is clear, there being so many
more occasions when some irresponsible person would be apt to be driving the ear in
question in the operation of such an establishment. Buxton v. Randel ('1944) 159 Kan.
245, 154 P. 2d 129."
While the cases included in the foregoing annotation at 47 A.L.R. (2d) 556 ·are not strictly in
10
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point since they discuss cases in which the omnibus
clause contains an exception or proviso, the effect
of which is to declare the clause inapplicable to a
public garage, automobile repair shop, automobile
sales agency, automobile service station and agents
or employees thereof, or some similar provision, an
examination of some of the eases included in the
annotation will serve to illustrate the purpose of the
exclusion and the philosophy behind it. On page 558
of the annotation it is said:
"An automobile repair shop owner to
whom the named assured has entrusted his car
for purposes of sale, the me ans and methods
of accomplishing which are left wholly discretionary, acts, while demonstrating the car
to a prospective purchaser, not as the servant
or agent of the named assured, but 'as an independent con tractor, and so, as regards an
accident occurring while he is so demonstrating the car, comes within the operation of a
proviso in an omnibus cia use containing an
exception whereby such clause is made inapplicable to a public automobile garrage, automobile repair shop, automobile sales agency,
automobile service station, and the agents or
employees thereof. State, use of Tondi v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. ( 1929) 156 Md. 684, 145
A 182, in which the court s'aid that the proviso in the policy would h ave but little meaning if the owner of an automobile repair shop
could step outside, disassociate himself temporarily from his business, proceed to sell a
car which for days had been left at his place
of business to be sold, and then successfully
1

1

1

11
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claim that he was not excluded by the pro-

.

VlSO • • •

"

On page 560 it is said:
"A casualty insurance company was held
in Macbeith v. Lacey ( 1944, Pa.) 92 Pitts b.
Leg. J. 1, not liable unaer 'a policy excluding
from coverage public garages, automobile repair shops, sales agencies, and service stations, and agents and employees thereof, and
a compulsory nonsuit was entered in favor of
the insurance company, as garnishee, where
fatal injuries had been sustained by the plaintiff's decedent while a passenger in the insured !automobile, which was being operated by
the service-sales manager of an automobile
dealer, a prospective customer of a tire and
service agency to which the owner had loaned
his car for dem'Onstration of a new make of
tires."
Under cases containing an exception relating
to public garages, sales agencies, service stations
an'd the like the fact that an automobile is 'being
operated in such business, either as a personal accommodation or without consideration, has been held
not to take the case outside of the exception.
In Canadian Indemnity Company v. Western
National Insur.ance Company, ( 1955), 134 Cal. App.
('2d) 512, 286 Pac. ( 2d) '532 the Canadi,an Indemnity Company issued its ·comprehensive li,ability
policy to Burnett covering his Auto Repair Shop
and Service Station including liability arising out
of the use of any automobile in connection with the
1
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operations of such station. The Western National
Insurance Company issued to Mercer a basic standard automobile policy covering his Lincoln automobile. Mercer was an employee of Burnett. On
occasion, Burnett used Mercer's Lincoln to pick up
spare parts needed in Burnett's repair business.
On June 2, 1953, Mercer arrive'd at the gar1age
at 4 :30 P.M. Mercer informed Burnett that he needed certain repair parts for a customer's car which
Mercer had ordered from Richmond Motors, but
which had not been delivered by Richmond Motors'
salesman, Williams. When Burnett ordered parts, if
he could not go ~after them, Williams, who was a
personal as well as a business friend of Burnett,
would deliver them. Mercer asked Burnett to pick
up the order. Burnett borrowed Mercer's Lincoln
for that purpose. Burnett learned. that William·s was
ill. He took the parts order with him, intending principally to pick up the repair parts, but was on his
way first to see Williiams before going on to Richmond Motors. Williams' home and Richmond Motors were in the same general direction. An ;accident
occurred 14 blocks from Williams' home and 10
blocks from Richmond Motors.
The Canadian Indemnity Company brought this
action for a declaratory judgment ~against the Western National Insurance Company contending that
the policies pro rated Burnett's liability and ap13
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pealed from a judgment decreeing that the Oanadian
Indemnity Company was responsible and that the
Western Insurance Company was not.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the evidence clearly supported the holding
(1) that the Lincoln was being used by the garage
owner for a purpose connected with the garage business, (2) that Burnett had not departed from or
abandoned his purpose of obtaining repair parts
by driving toward Williams' home en route, and
('3) th!at coverage for Burnett was therefore excluded un'der the Garage Exception to the omnibus
clause of Mercer's policy with the Western Insurance
Company.
In the case of Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corporation v. Blackstock (193'5), 165 Va. 98, 1'81 S.E.
364 the insurer issued its policy to Wynn covering
her automobile. Taylor operated ·a filling station,
Wynn was ~a customer of long standing. Wynn's
automobile developed a frozen radiator while being
operated by a brother of Wynn. The brother called
Taylor an'd !asked him to come for the automobile
and take it to his ·service station to thaw it out or
do whatever was necessary to the radiator. The
brother knew that Taylor's service station contained
1a heated wash pit in which an automobile could be
thawed out.
·Taylor got the automobile and on the way to
14
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the service station had an accident. Blackstock was
injured. Blackstock recovered a judgment against
Taylor and then brought this action against the insurer. The insurer appealed from an adverse judg..
ment.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the accident arose out of the operation of
the service station rather than as a part of 'an individual accommodation to the brother, whether
Taylor expected to charge for the service or merely
genertal service to valuable customers.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT IS NOT
OBLIGATED TO REIMBURSE THE PLAINTIFF FOR
ANY ATTORNEY FEES OR COSTS INCURRED IN
THE DEFENSE OF THE ACTION AGAINST JOHN
H. MORGAN, JR.

While the defendant and respondent relied primarily upon the defense set out in Point I above,
the court below actually decided this case in the
defendant's favor upon the ground set out 'in its
Conclusions Of Law (R. 41), to the effect that the
attorney fees and costs incurred by the plaintiff
were incurred by the pltain tiff and not by John H.
Morgan, Jr., were incurred by the plaintiff primarily for its own benefit and not the benefit of John
H. Morgan, Jr. and that, therefore, the defendant
was not obligated to reimburse the plaintiff for the
attorney fees or costs which it had expended. In
15
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discussing this point we must assume that the trial
court was correct in holding that the defendant and
respondent did afford John H. Morgan, Jr. coverage under its policy of insurance, although by so
doing we do not intend to concede this issue. It
should also be noted that the question involved here
is not which of the two carriers should pay any
judgment which m1ay have been entered against
John H. Morgan, Jr., there being none, but whether
the plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs in defending an action brought against John H. Morgan,
Jr., an obligation which it assumed under its own
policy of insurance.
This very question was involved in the case of
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v.
Tri-State Insurance Company, decided in the United
States Court of Appeals ('lOth Circuit), 285 Fed.
('2d) 579. This was an action brought by ~ carrier
of excess automobile liability insurance to obtain
contribution from a primary insurer with respect
to the amount expended in the successful defense of
liability claims presented in the state courts against
the insured. In the words of the Court:
"The incident giving rise to the state
court liability claims made 1against the common 'insured, Kerr Glass Company (Kerr),
was an automobile accident involving a nonowned truck being used by Kerr for a shipment of that company's product in interstate
16
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commerce. The U.S.F & G. policy was issued
directly to Kerr as a named insured and is
referred to as a comprehensive general automobile liability policy. The Tri-State policy
was issued to the owner-operator of the truck,
one Barsh, as the named insured but defined
'insured' as including 'any .person or organization legally responsible for the use (of
the truck) , provided the actual use (of the
truck) is by the named insured or with his
permission ... ' It is not disputed that Kerr
was an ad'di tional insured as defined in the
Tri-State policy and as applied to the circumstance of the 1accident premising the
claims made against Kerr.
''Both policies contained standard indemnification provisions, the policy limit of U.S.F.
& G. being $100,000 - $200,000 and Tri-State
being $10,000 - $·20,000. Other applicable provisions of both policies provided:
" 'Insuring Agreements
"'II. Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Payments.
" 'As respects the insuflance afforded by
the other terms of this policy the Company
shall:
"'(a) defend any suit against the Insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease
or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent; * * *.
"'The amounts incurred under this insuring agreement, except settlements of c1aims
and suits, are payable by the Company in
addition to the applicable limit of liability of
this policy.
17
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" 'Conditions

* * *

"'13. Other Insurance. If the Insured
has other insurance against a loss covered by
this policy the Company shall not be liable
under this policy for a greater proportion of
such loss than the applicable limit of liability
stated in the declarations bears to the total
applicable limit of li:ability of all valid ;and
collectible insurance against such loss; provided, however, the insurance under this policy
with respect to loss arising out of the use of
any non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other V1alid and collectible
insurance available to the Insured, either as
an Insured under a policy applicable with respect to such automobile or otherwise.'"
A lawsuit was filed agiainst Kerr which TriState refused to defend, and thereupon U.S.F. & G.
undertook the sole defense in behalf of Kerr. A
judgment was obtained against Kerr in the lower
court, which was set aside upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Oklahom~a. The amount sought in
the action was the reasonable cost, including attorney
fees, of the defense made by U.S.F. & G. The Court
said:
"An insurance carrier has the duty tD
use the utmost good faith in the disposition
of cla:lms made ag1ainst ilts insured. National
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Britt, 203 Okl. 175,
200 P. 2d 407, 218 P. 2d 1039; American FideHty & Casualty Co. v. All American Bus
Lines, 10 Cir., 190 F. 2d 234. And this duty
is not lessened by the existence of excess in18
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surance but is extended to include the excess
carrier within the shelter of the obligation.
St. Paul...:Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Martin,
10 Cir., 190 F. 2d 455. The oblig1ation to the
excess carrier is not contractual and is based
only upon 'the duty of the primary carrier to
perform the obligation which it alone has assumed, that is, provide primary coverage. Lack
of good :faith in this regard may extend the
primary carrier's obligation beyond the stated
policy limit, St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co.
v. M1artin, supra, and extend the point at
which the secondary liability of the excess
carrier attaches. But contrary to the contententions of U.S.F. & G. these rules 1are not
applicable to the instant case. That company
did not pay out any sum under its excess insurance provision. As we have earlier indicated, the claim against Kerr Wlas ultimately
held to be without merit and the conduct of
Tri-State has not damaged U.S.F. & G. by
way of indemnification to its insured.
"Tri-State did breach its contract with
Kerr by refusing to defend. This obligation
existed regardless of the merit or lack of
merit of the claim. But again, no contractual
relationship existed between Tri-State and
U.S.F. & G. and the latter does not claim by
subrogation. U.S~F. & G. also had a policy
obligation to defend Kerr and this obligation,
unlike the secondary liability as an excess
carrier for indemnification, was a primary
obligation co-existent with that of Tri-State.
The agreement to furnish such service, several with the two companies, is distinct from
and in addition to the insuring agreement per19
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taining to liability. The question here thus
narrows to whether contribution will lie between two insurance companies when each
has a policy containing a defense a;greement.
The question has 'been answered in the negative, and we believe, properly so, in a number
of cases. The duty to defend is personal to
each insurer. The obligation is several 1and
the carrier is not entitled to divide the duty
nor require contribution from another absent
a specific con tractua:l right . . .''
To the same effect see the case of Financial
Indemnity Company v. Colon~al Insurance Company
(California), 281 Pac. ( 2d) 883. In this action plaintiff sued for declaratory relief to determine the
rights and obligations of the parties arising from
two public liability policies issued respectively by
the parties to one Charles Tamagri, a trucking service operator, and particularly to recover half of the
amount expended by plaintiff for attorney fees and
investigation expense in defense of an action agiainst
the insured. Plaintiff appealed on an agreed Statement Of Facts from a judgment denying recovery.
The plaintiff had defended the insured successfully
in a personal injury action. A considerable portion
of the briefs was devoted to the question of whether
or not one insurance company would be required to
contribute to the other insurance company had a
judgment been secured against the insured. The Supreme Court of the State of California said:
1

"The issue of defendant's indemnity li20
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ability is immaterial. Each policy provided
for defense of the assured in the event of suit.
Plaintiff's policy provided for pro rata payment of a loss in the event there was other
insurance. Defendant's policy provided, in case
of other insurance, tha:t it would pay only the
excess of the loss over the amount of the other
insurance. Attached to each policy was a
'Standard Form of Endorsement Prescribed
by the Public Utilities Commission of the State
of California' known as 'Form T & S 391'
which apparently reduced the liability under
each policy to $5,000 for personal injury. Most
of the trial and a large portion of the briefs
were devoted to the question of whether under
the policies and the endorsement defendant's
li'ability in the event Oritz had recovered damages against Tamagri, would not h!ave accrued
until plaintiff had paid the 'full face ~alue of
its policy as limited by the rider, $'5,000 or
when it had paid only $'2,500. The trial court
found thJat the insured's policy with plaintiff
constituted 'other insurance' and that defendant's policy was excess over and above the
limits of plaintiff's policy and not pro-rata
insurance. Plaintiff attacks this finding. However, we fail to understand how this question
is relevant or important to the real issues in
this case. Tamagri won the personal injury
action, so neither insurer was called upon to
pay any amount of indemnity. Oritz sued
Tamagri for $100,680.58. Until the action
was fully tried and judgment rendered, neither insurer would know what its indemnity
liability was. Obviously the amount sued for
was in excess of the total liability of both insurers under any theory. Each party was re21
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quired by its own policy to defend Tamagri
in that suit.
"Plaintiff contends that as to the obligation to defend the two insurance companies
were cosureties and not coinsurers, 1and that
therefore the rule set forth in Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Fireman's F. I.
Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 100 'P. 2d 364, should
apply. ]twas there held as to indemnity thJat
where two insurance companies fully insure
the same risk and one complany pays the total
loss, that company may force contribution
from the other, but that if both policies contain a pro-rata or coinsurer clause, the insurers are deemed to be coinsurers and not
cosureties and nei1ther can recover from the
other rany amount it may have paid in excess
of its pro rata share of the entire loss. While
the fact that here both companies in their
policies agreed to defend the assured 'bears
some analogy to the situation where both companies have agreed to indemnify the 1assured
against the total loss, nevertheless the agreement to defend is not only completely independent of and severable from the indemnity
provisions of the policy, but is completely different. Indemnity contemplates merely the
payment of money. The agreement to defend
con tern plates the rendering of services. The
insurer must investigate, and conduct the defense, ~and may if it deems it expedient, negotiate and make a settlement of the suit. These
matters each insurer is required to do regardless of what the other insurer is doing. While
both n1ay join together in the services and
share experiences, there is no requirement
1
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that they do so. Conceivably, one might disagree with the other as to the strategy of the
investigation and defense. It could act independently of the other. Thus the relationship
is more that of coinsurer than cosurety. As
to the assured, neither one is excused to any
extent from its full duty to defend, no matter
what the other does. The duty to defend is
personal to the particular insurer. It is not
entitled to divide that duty with or require
contribution from the other.''
In Traveler's Indemnity Company v. American
Indemnity Company (Tex1as), 315 S.D. ('2d) 677
an action was brought by the plain tiff insurer
against the defendant insurer to recover a pro rata
share of a settlement it had made with an injured
third person and for attorney fees. The trial court
rendered a judgment for the plaintiff for a share
of the settlement and a:ttorney fees, but the judgment was modified by the Court of Civil Appeals
hy eliminating attorney fees from the judgment.
The Court held that unless provided for by contract
or statute 'attorney fees may not be recovered.
In a case decided in the United States District
Court in Minnesota, Traveler's Insurance Company
v. American Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 115'4 Fed.
Supp. 393, the court, while holding tha;t the plaintiff
insurer was entitled to recover from the defendant
insurer the amount of a judgment against its insured, refused to allow the recovery of attorney
fees, saying:
23
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"With regard to costs of defense and attorney fees both insurers were obligated to
defend Schneider's suit. This obligation was
several :and not joint; consequently Travelers,
having paid these costs, is not entitled to recover for them against American."
Some of the authorities cited by the plaintiff
concern only the question ras to whether or not an
excess insurance carrier can recover from a primary insurance carrier the amount of 1a settlement
or judgment which 'the excess insurance carrier has
paid on behalf of the insured, 1and are not directed
toward the question as to whether one insurer can
recover attorney fees from another.
In the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Buckeye Union Casualty Company, '1157 Ohio
St. 385, 105 N.E. (2d) 568, cited on page 6 of the
plaintiff's and Appellrant's Brief, the only question
involved was whether or not one insurance company
could recover from another insurance company the
1amount of the settlement which the first insurance
company had made on behalf of an insured. The case
does not discuss the question of costs of defense or
attorney fees.
Nor was this que~tion discussed in Kenner v.
Century Indemnity Company, 320 Mass. 6, 67 N.E.
(2d) 769, 16'5 A.L.R. 1463.

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
An insurance policy is a contract between an
insurer land the named insured or those persons falling within the definition of an "insured" under the
omnibus c~ause of such policy, whereby the insurer
agrees within certain limits to answer for damages
which the insured may become legally obligated to
pay because of certain events or conditions outlined
in the policy of insurance; and the insured agrees
to pay a premium commensurate with the amount
of protection afforded. The premium chJarged for
the policy will, of course, vary with the risk to which
the insurer exposes itself. Where there is greater
risk involved in insuring those people who fall within a certain class than is usulal and ordinary, then
a different premium is charged for those policies
which insure that particullar class and special policies are written. Exclusions are written into the
usual and ordinary policy which would exclude coverage for such persons or individUials at the rates
charged for the usual and ordinary policy. An alterna:tive might be to leave these exclusions out of
a policy and increase the premium charged for all
policies, but this would only penalize the whole for
the hazards connected with insuring a certain group.
One group which has been found to be more hazardous is thJat group of persons engaged in the automdbile business such as automobile repair shops,
sales agencies, garages and the like.
25
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Subject only to the limitations prescribed by
the laws of the various states as a condition to an
insurance company's writing insurlance in a particular state, which laws are designed to afford the
public ample protection, !an insured and an insurer
should be free to enter into whatever contracts they
desire and an insurer should be free to select that
group of persons which it desires to insure for a
specified rate. One of the provisions contained in
insurance policies and contained in the policy issued
by the defendant Farmers Insurance ExchJange in
this case is that insurance afforded under the policy
does not apply while the automobile described in
the policy is being used in the automobile business
where it is not being used by the named insured
or his relatives. The cases cited herein evidence
the courts do give effect to these exclusions in insurance policies.
The particular ph~aseology of the exclusion in
this case, "while the described automobile is being
used in the automobile business", is somewhat new
but has been defined ~as the business of selling, repairing, servi\cing or parking of automobiles; and
an automobile used in the automobile business has
been held to be one which was employed for some
purpose in connection with that business, such as
a tow truck or an ~automobile used for demonstration purposes.
26
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The evidence in this case shows that the named
insured under the defendant's and respondent's
policy, R1aymond Earl Thomas, permitted John H.
Morgan, J 1·. to take his automobile while the autom·dbile of John H. Morgan, Jr. was being repaired
by the garage which employed Mr. Thomas. Mr.
Thomas was not even acquainted with Mr. Morgan.
The only possible benefit which Mr. Thomas could
have hoped to secure was the future good-will 1and
patronage of Mr. Morgan. Moreover, the automobile of Mr. Thomas was being used in ex1actly the
same manner as an automobile provided by the gar~age for the same purpose had one been available.
It is, therefore, apparent that this automobile was
being used in the automobile business at the time
and that coverage was not, therefore, afforded under
the defendant's and respondent's policy.
Even assuming, however, that John H. Morgan,
Jr. was an insured under the defendant's and respondent's policy, this does not entitle the plaintiff
and appellant to recover from the defendant the
'attorney fees and costs which it incurred in defending an action brought against Mr. Morgan as aresult of an accident which occurred when he was using
Mr. Thomas' car. The evidence is undisputed that
John H. Morgan, Jr. was 'also 'insured by ran 'insurance policy issued by the plain tiff and that by its
policy it agreed to pay all expenses incurred by it
27
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and all costs arising out of an action brought ag1ainst
its insured falling within the coverage provided by
the policy. In defending John H. Morgan, Jr. it did
nothin'g which it was not already obligated to do
by its policy of insurance. To s'ay th!a;t it is entitled
to recover these attorney fees and costs from this
defendant is merely to say that it should be paid
for doing what i t was already obligated to do.
1

The fact that one insurer m1ay bre'ach its contract with the insured does not justify another insurer from breaching its contract; nor should the
fact that one breaches its contract give the other
any right 1a:gainst the one guilty of such breach.
To say that the plaintiff is subrogated to the rights
of John H. Morgan, Jr. begs the question. In the
first instance, he was paid no attorney fees or costs
nor has any judgment been rendered against him
~and he, therefore, has no rights. In the second instance, we might ask what rights - those which
he had against the defendant under its policy or
those which he had against the plaintiff under its
policy?
1

The cases which have dealt with the right of
one insurer to recover a ttorney fees and costs from
another 'insurer have recognized that the duty to
defend the insured is personal to each insurer and
is a several and not a joint obligation. The fact that
one insurer, acting in good faith upon grounds which
1
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appear to it to be justified at the time, may escape
its obligation to the insured may not justify another
insurer from escaping its obligation.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
judgment of the tri1al court should be affirmed
either upon the theory that the defendant and respondent did not afford insurance coverage under
this case or that, affording it, the plaintiff insurer
is not entitled 'to recover attorney fees 'and costs
paid out under its policy of insu~ance from the defendant insurer.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GAR'RETT
DON J. HANSON
Attorneys for
Defendants and Respondents
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